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Abstract 
A field experiment on crowdfunding for a club good* 
 
 
 
While increasingly popular in many domains crowdfunding remains largely un-
derresearched and little is known about the best way to encourage participation. 
In a field experiment we vary suggested amounts and test different wordings for a 
campaign to finance a club good—an institute’s summer party with free food, 
drinks, and music. We find that higher suggestions shift the median and the mode 
of gifts from €5 to €10 at a similar response rate. We also find evidence in favor of 
a “donation” frame that generates higher income than a “contribution” frame. 
 
 
Keywords: Crowdfunding, field experiment. 
 
JEL classifications: C93, D64, D12. 
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experiment. This paper has been screened to ensure that no confidential information is revealed. 
 
1 Introduction 
Crowdfunding has become a popular tool to raise money for projects and attracted investments of 
$5.1 billion in 2013 alone.1 Successfully funded projects include movies, video games, software, 
and electronic appliances but also charitable projects, scientific research for rare genetic diseases, 
or museum projects. One of the most successful projects so far has been the video game “Star 
Citizen” which surpassed $117 million in contributions in July 2016.2 But there are also many 
campaigns for small projects; notably for the arts and for local purposes. 
In this paper, we focus on the ask strategy used in a local crowdfunding campaign. We 
implemented a crowdfunding campaign to finance an institute’s yearly summer party with free 
food, drinks, and music. The party normally attracts more than 150 participants. In previous 
years, a “donation box” had been placed in a prominent location during the party but it frequently 
led to a shortfall of money. This time, around 20 days in advance, a crowdfunding campaign was 
announced in personalized emails. The campaign offered a multitude of incentives: rewards like 
vouchers for the participation in tournaments and games, bonus payments for early gifts, as well 
as numerous reminders. The experimental variation included two different suggestions regarding 
the amount of the gift and a variation in wording: “donation” versus “contribution.” 
Concerning the suggested amount, we implemented non-binding suggestions of €10 and €20. 
Although some evidence on the role of suggestions is available from the literature on charitable 
giving, the overall picture is inconclusive (see literature section). Moreover, there is little know 
about the effect of suggestions when different amounts also go hand in hand with different 
rewards. In many ways, there appears to be less room for suggestion effects in crowdfunding. 
There is, of course, vast evidence on the effect of framing on the economic behavior of agents 
even when the fundamentals do not change (see, e.g. Andreoni 1995). We implemented a very 
small manipulation in the wording of our emails: “donation” versus “contribution.” While 
                                                          
1 Schroter, Wil, Top 10 Business Crowdfunding Campaigns Of All Time, Forbes, Apr 16, 2014, 
http://onforb.es/1hJYoo8 (retrieved on 9 July 2016). 
2 See https://robertsspaceindustries.com/funding-goals (retrieved on 9 July 2016). 
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“donation” has a clear meaning that alludes to charitable giving, “contribution” has multiple 
meanings including some that are only loosely related to fundraising. In Appendix A, we present 
word association maps that show different meanings and their connections. The act of “donating” 
is more self-oriented while “contributing” invokes a notion of joint participation. The more 
unique meaning and the connotation with voluntary charitable giving of the word “donation” 
could possibly be more successful at stimulating warm glow while “contribution” might be 
connected to a less voluntary and less individual act.  
 
2 Literature 
Our paper contributes to the growing but still very young literature on crowdfunding. A general 
overview on the economics of the crowdfunding market is provided in Agrawal et al. (2014) and 
Strausz (2015) provides a formal model. Most of the existing studies on crowdfunding make use 
of observational data (e.g. Meer 2014, Argo et al. 2016). While those are usually based on 
extremely rich data, the question of whether the observed correlations can be interpreted as causal 
relationships is not always obvious. The number of field experiments on crowdfunding is still 
small. In one such field experiment, Burtch et al. (2015) study the effects of privacy and find that 
reducing access to information controls induces a net increase in fund-raising. 
Studies related to our paper involved email communication that aimed at increasing participation 
in crowdfunding and similar projects. In a series of field experiments by Ling et al. (2005), 
emails were sent to members of the online community Movie-Lens asking them to rate movies. 
There were different versions of the messages that varied the goal setting and information on 
relative performance; these generated unequal response rates. Interestingly, the rating activities of 
the members rose in immediate response to the email messages but faded quickly. In another 
field experiment, Chen et al. (forthcoming) studied lending teams on Kiva who receive emails 
summarizing daily forum messages. Compared to the control, they find that lenders make 
significantly more loans when exposed to a goal-setting and coordination message. Chen and 
Konstan (2015) present a survey of methods and papers that involve online field experiments. 
Crowdfunding shares some similarities with pay-what-you-want schemes (PWYW) in which, in 
exchange for a product or service, customers set their own price. The main difference is, 
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however, that crowdfunding usually is applied at the development stage and PWYW at the 
production stage or when a product is already available. Schmidt et al. (2015) present theoretical 
and experimental evidence that PWYW can be an attractive marketing strategy to price 
discriminate between fair-minded and selfish customers, to fully penetrate a market without 
giving away the product for free, and to undercut competitors that use posted prices. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on fundraising. Specifically, we add to the literature 
on suggestions in charitable giving. In a field experiment, Adena et al. (2014) found that non-
binding donation suggestions of €100 generated higher revenue for a charity than no suggestions 
and €200 suggestions, and that they significantly changed the distribution of gifts.  Edwards and 
List (2014) compared no suggestions to a $20 suggestion (and some unusual amounts). The 
authors found that more people give if a suggestion is offered and they tend to give exactly the 
suggested amount. Adena and Huck (2016) and Reiley and Samek (2015) compared higher and 
lower donation grids (a menu of donation amounts to choose from) and found detrimental effects 
of higher grids. In a large online experiment, Altmann et al. (2014) varied default donations. 
Although, they found a difference in distribution, there was no overall revenue effect.  Summing 
up, the literature is inconclusive on how to design suggestions optimally. 
Second, we add to the literature on framing in charitable giving. In related work, Grau and Folse 
(2007) found a difference between positive and negative framing in donations that are tied to the 
purchase of a product. 
Although there are many similarities between crowdfunding and charitable giving, an important 
difference is the nature of the (club) good for which the money is collected. Traditional 
beneficiaries of charitable giving are other people. Crowdfunding, on the other hand, often 
emphasizes the funder’s benefits like receiving the product once it is produced. While traditional 
charitable giving does typically not involve gifts for donors, crowdfunding campaigns usually 
offer different rewards for different contributions. In the context of charitable giving, rewards 
have been studied by, among others, Falk (2007) who found that gifts handed out with the ask 
increase response rates. 
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3 Experimental setup 
We manipulated emails that were sent to employees, guests, and affiliated researchers of a 
research institute asking them to take part in a crowdfunding campaign for the institute’s annual 
summer party. Almost 550 emails were sent out 20 days before the party. A 2x2 design involved 
one treatment pair with two different suggestions regarding the gift amounts and one pair with a 
variation in wording. The email recipients were asked to contribute {donate} money or pledge a 
buffet contribution {donation} for the party. We implemented a multitude of incentives, 
including various rewards staggered by levels of contributions like vouchers for participation in 
tournaments and games. Moreover, we offered bonus payments for early gifts and numerous 
reminders. It was also announced that any surplus money would be donated to a refugee project 
(see Appendix C for details of the mailing).  
In the “donation” treatment, the word “donation” appears 19 times in the first email, once in the 
first (short) reminder, twice in the second reminder, and four times in the third reminder, whereas 
the word “contribution” is never used. Each time the email was sent, all the previous email 
communications were appended such that with the third reminder the total word count of 
“donation” was 26. The “contribution” treatment involved the same number of uses of the word 
“contribution” and no use of “donation”. 
The suggestion was introduced in the first email with the following sentence: “If the average 
monetary contribution is €20 <€10>, we need 100 <200> participants in the campaign to cover 
the expected costs.” The same sentence was repeated in the last reminder. 
We implemented blocked randomization. The available individual characteristics are based on 
membership in email lists such as “female,” “postdocs”, “PhD students”, different departments, 
or different administration mailing lists etc. Some of the characteristics were corrected by hand. 
All variables used for the randomization and mean comparisons between different treatments can 
be seen in Appendix A. Due to our use of blocked randomization and the relatively high response 
rate that we expected, we assumed enough power to detect treatment differences.  
By choosing personalized emails, we aimed at reducing spillovers between treatments. We 
cannot rule out that recipients talked about the party with each other. But since the differences 
between the emails were rather subtle, they should probably have gone unnoticed. First, the 
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words “donation” and “contribution” are substitutes, and the use of both words in this context is 
natural. Second, the suggestions were designed in such a way as to sum up to a total and identical 
threshold of €2000—probably a more interesting issue than the suggestion itself. If there was 
some awareness about treatment differences, for which we do not have any evidence, then our 
results would constitute the lower bound of the true treatment effects. 
The total money collected was updated daily on the institute’s intranet and communicated via 
reminders over the course of the campaign. 
 
4 Results 
The campaign achieved a total of 127 contributions3 (either monetary, buffet or both) implying a 
response rate of 23%. The average donation was €12 and the median €10. Figure 1 below 
presents the number of gifts by day, and suggests the importance of reminders, since most 
donations came in shortly after the reminders were sent out. Most gifts were exactly equal to the 
amounts specified in the reward scheme (€5, €10, €20, €30, €100 and one buffet contribution 
worth €10) but there were also a few other amounts. There were four donations larger than €30 
including two €100 donations. Overall, the campaign was successful in collecting enough money 
to cover the costs, though it fell short of the announced monetary threshold of €2000 if buffet 
donations are not counted. The final sum was €1506 in donations plus a €395 bonus (each 
donation given within the first week received a match of €5 from an anonymous donor). In total, 
the number of buffet pledges was 34. In the subsequent analysis we do not monetize buffet 
donations but rather present separate results for shares of buffet contributions. However, in 
Appendix B, we present an alternative approach in which we assign the implicit value of €10 to a 
buffet contribution. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Not counting the contributions from people involved in the design of the experiment. 
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Figure 1: Number of contributions by day and reminders 
 
 
 
Suggestions of €10 and €20 
Table 1 presents the results by different suggestion levels. While the response rate was almost 
identical in both treatments, the average positive donation increased by €1.75 or 16% when the 
higher amount was suggested. The median increased from €5 in the €10-suggestion treatment to 
€10 in the €20-suggestion treatment. A Mann-Whitney test confirms a difference in distributions. 
Since the shares of individuals that contributed to the buffet were similar between treatments, we 
do not see any substitution between monetary and non-monetary donations. Figure 2 presents the 
distribution of different gift categories by the suggested level (€10 and €20). There is a visible 
shift in the distribution towards larger amounts with higher suggestions. Moreover, the mode 
increases from €5 with lower suggestions to €10 with higher suggestions. Table 2 confirms the 
impression from Figure 2. The giving frequency of €5 is higher with lower suggestions and this 
difference is statistically significant. The giving frequencies of €10 as well as €15 and over are 
higher with higher suggestions, with only the first difference being statistically significant. 
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Although the overall monetary return is higher with higher suggestions, it is so only by 12% and 
this difference is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 1: Results of suggestions 
Treatment Number 
of 
subjects 
Number 
of 
monetary 
gifts 
Monetary  
return per 
mail 
Average 
positive 
donation 
Minimum 
Median 
Maximum 
Share 
monetary 
gift 
Share 
buffet 
Overall 
response 
rate 
(1) €10 272 61 2.5 11.148 5 0.235 0.066 0.243 
   (0.472) (1.699) 5 
100 
(0.026) (0.015) (0.026) 
(2) €20 273 59 2.788 12.898 5 0.237 0.059 0.234 
   (0.508) (1.833) 10 
100 
(0.026) (0.014) (0.026) 
T-test p-value 
(1)=(2) 
  0.679 0.485  0.901 0.716 0.822 
Mann-Whitney 
test p-value 
   0.086     
Note: standard error in parenthesis  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Test of differences in distribution among treatments 
Treatment Number 
of 
subjects 
Frequency of giving 
€5 €10 €15 and more 
(1) €10 61 0.508 0.279 0.213 
  (0.065) (0.058) (0.053) 
(2) €20 59 0.305 0.424 0.254 
  0.060 (0.065) (0.057) 
t-test p-value (1)=(2)  0.023 0.097 0.598 
Note: standard error in parenthesis, conditional on giving money. 
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Figure 2: Number of donations in different categories by suggested gift level 
 
Note: there was one donation of €6 and one of €25. 
 
 
 
 
Donations versus Contributions 
Tables 3 and 4, and Figure 3 present the results from the framing treatments. The use of the word 
“donation” instead of “contribution” resulted in a slightly higher response rate (by 14%, non-
significant), much higher average positive donation (by 48% or €4.57), and much higher overall 
return (by 69% or €1.36). The second and third differences are statistically significant and mainly 
come from the upper part of the distribution, which can be seen from Table 4. The share of gifts 
of €15 and over is twice as big in the “donation” treatment as compared to the “contribution” 
treatment (significant at the 10% level). Altogether, with the “donation” framing, higher gifts are 
more common and their value is higher. 
0
10
20
30
0 5-6 10 15 20-25 30 and over
10 20 10 20 10 20 10 20 10 20 10 20
by suggested donation level
Number of donations in different categories
no buffet  plus buffet
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Table 3: Results of different wording 
Treatment Number 
of 
subjects 
Number 
of 
monetary 
gifts 
Monetary 
return 
per mail 
Average 
positive 
donation 
Minimum 
Median 
Maximum 
Share 
monetary 
gift 
Share 
buffet 
Overall 
response 
rate 
(1) contribution 273 56 1.963 9.571 5 0.220 0.059 0.223 
   (0.279) (0.744) 10 
30 
(0.025) (0.014) (0.025) 
(2) donation 272 64 3.327 14.141 5 0.246 0.066 0.254 
   (0.634) (2.218) 10 
100 
(0.026) (0.015) (0.026) 
T-test p-value (1)=(2)   0.049 0.067  0.465 0.716 0.409 
Mann-Whitney test p-
value 
   0.344     
Note: standard error in parenthesis  
 
 
Figure 3: Number of donations in different categories by wording 
 
Note: there was one donation of €6 and one of €25. 
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Table 4: Test of differences in distribution among treatments 
Treatment Number 
of 
subjects 
Frequency of giving 
€5 €10 €15 and more 
(3) contribution 56 0.411 0.411 0.161 
  (0.066) (0.066) (0.050) 
(4) donation 64 0.406 0.297 0.297 
  (0.062) (0.058) (0.058) 
t-test p-value (1)=(2)  0.961 0.195 0.080 
Note: standard error in parenthesis, conditional on giving money. 
 
 
 
Individual characteristics 
Finally, we explore the available information on personal characteristics. However, one must be 
cautious with the interpretation, since the individual characteristics are likely related to the actual 
attendance of the summer party and this, in turn, with the participation in the crowdfunding 
campaign.  
In Table 5, we present the results from simple regressions including individual characteristic 
dummies. Column I looks at the monetary return per email by presenting the results from an OLS 
regression with contributions (including zeros) as the dependent variable. Column II shows the 
effect of individual characteristics on positive donations only (OLS regression). Column III 
analyses the response rate by presenting the marginal effects from a probit regression. When 
looking at the dummies professor, postdoc, PhD student, student RA, and administrative staff, 
note that the reference group is the remainder including current guests, alumni or affiliated 
researchers not on the institute’s payroll. First, we see that the response rate of postdocs, PhD 
students, and administrative staff is significantly higher. In terms of positive donations, those 
given by professors clearly stand out (an increase by €30). The combined result—the return—is 
significantly higher from professors and administrative staff. 
11 
 
In Appendix A, we present separate and more detailed comparisons between the group of 
academics and the administrative staff, subgroups of the academics only, and between male and 
female email recipients that confirm the above results. We also test for heterogeneous treatment 
effects and find that females respond more often when the “donation” framing is used and that 
the administrative staff members are less responsive to higher suggestions. 
 
Table 5: Individual characteristics 
 Monetary return Average 
positive gift 
Overall 
response rate 
 OLS OLS Probit m.e. 
“donation” 1.402** 4.265* 0.030 
 (0.680) (2.273) (0.036) 
    
€20 suggestion 0.189 1.604 -0.013 
 (0.680) (2.258) (0.036) 
    
female 0.229 -2.576 0.039 
 (0.701) (2.337) (0.037) 
    
professor 6.394*** 30.731*** 0.023 
 (1.664) (5.890) (0.090) 
    
postdoc 1.327 -2.405 0.148*** 
 (1.107) (3.498) (0.055) 
    
PhD student 0.528 -3.239 0.114** 
 (0.989) (3.151) (0.051) 
    
student RA -1.424 -5.887 -0.092 
 (1.070) (4.984) (0.064) 
    
administrative staff 1.815* 1.111 0.154*** 
 (0.968) (2.926) (0.048) 
    
Constant 0.929 10.293***  
 (0.851) (3.140)  
Observations 544 119 544 
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.050 0.280 0.044 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we present results from a field experiment on crowdfunding for a club good. We 
varied the message within the crowdfunding campaign in order to test what works best to 
increase participation. 
We find evidence in favor of higher non-binding suggestions similar to those observed in to 
Adena et al. (2014) and Edwards and List (2014). Higher suggestions of €20 changed the 
distribution of gifts generating more €10 donations and fewer €5 donations, changing both the 
median and the mode, and increased the overall return, although not significantly. The results 
differ from experiments on donation grids in Adena and Huck (2016) and Reiley and Samek 
(2015) who found detrimental effects of higher grids. A potential explanation for these 
differences may be that suggestions are softer than grids and that higher contributions also go 
hand in hand with greater rewards in a typical crowdfunding campaign. 
Concerning the wording, we found that the “donation” frame attracted more and higher donations 
than the “contribution” treatment. We suppose that “donation” is more effective in stimulating 
warm-glow giving. Given that both our manipulations are relatively small and their effects 
surprisingly big, we expect that there is much potential for improving the effectiveness of 
crowdfunding campaigns through systematic experimentation. 
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Appendix A 
Randomization 
Figure A1: The results of randomization by different treatment groups 
 
Note: 95% Cis. Nawi- PhD students, RA- student research assistants, SPI-V are different 
academic groups. Last row presents different administrative divisions. 
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The associations with the words “contribution” and “donation” (source: http://www.snappywords.com/)
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Table A1: Academics versus administration 
Group Number 
of 
subjects 
Number 
of 
monetary 
gifts 
Overall 
return 
per mail 
Average 
positive 
donation 
Minimu
m 
Median 
Maximu
m 
Share 
monetary 
gift 
share 
buffet 
Overall 
response 
rate 
(1) academics 325 64 2.354 11.953 5 0.2 0.046 0.203 
   (0.429) (1.731) 10 
100 
(0.022) (0.012) (0.022) 
(2) administratio
n 
118 36 3.686 12.083 5 0.331 0.085 0.339 
   (.958) (2.675) 10 
100 
(0.043) (0.026) (0.044) 
T-test p-value 
(1)=(2) 
  0.147 0.966  0.004 0.120 0.003 
Mann-Whitney 
test p-value 
   0.869     
Note: standard error in parenthesis  
Figure A2: Academic level 
  
Note: 95% Cis 
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Table A2: Gender 
Group Number 
of 
subjects 
Number 
of 
monetary 
gifts 
Overall 
return 
per mail 
Average 
positive 
donation 
Minimu
m 
Median 
Maximu
m 
Share 
monetary 
gift 
share 
buffet 
Overall 
response 
rate 
(3) male 269 54 2.494 12.426 5 0.204 0.048 0.212 
   (0.485) (1.899) 10 
100 
(0.025) (0.013) (0.025) 
(4) female 276 66 2.790 11.667 5 0.261   0.076 0.264 
   (0.496) (1.660) 10 
100 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.027) 
T-test p-value 
(1)=(2) 
  0.670 0.763  0.120 0.181 0.150 
Mann-Whitney 
test p-value 
   0.292     
Note: standard error in parenthesis  
Heterogenous treatment effects 
Table A3: Interaction with gender 
 Monetary return Average 
positive gift 
Overall 
response rate 
 OLS OLS Probit m.e. 
“donation” 0.683 6.283* -0.053 
 (0.985) (3.725) (0.053) 
    
€20 suggestion -0.720 -2.252 -0.037 
 (0.985) (3.712) (0.053) 
    
female -1.362 -3.586 -0.053 
 (1.197) (4.313) (0.063) 
    
Female*“donation” 1.337 -2.698 0.155** 
 (1.384) (5.057) (0.072) 
    
Female*€20 
suggestion 
1.969 6.918 0.053 
 (1.384) (4.996) (0.073) 
    
Constant 2.513*** 10.676***  
 (0.850) (2.954)  
Observations 545 120 545 
R2 /Pseudo R2 0.013 0.052 0.013 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A4: Interaction with administrative staff 
 Monetary 
return 
Average 
positive gift 
Overall 
response rate 
 OLS OLS Probit m.e. 
“donation” 1.256 4.830 0.017 
 (0.776) (3.000) (0.042) 
    
€20 suggestion 1.074 3.630 0.011 
 (0.776) (3.000) (0.042) 
    
Administrative 
staff 
3.086** 3.576 0.137* 
 (1.461) (4.574) (0.072) 
    
Administrative 
staff *“donation” 
0.787 0.047 0.062 
 (1.666) (5.508) (0.084) 
    
Administrative 
staff*€20 
suggestion 
-4.116** -7.735 -0.099 
 (1.668) (5.583) (0.083) 
    
Constant 1.160* 7.395***  
 (0.667) (2.671)  
Observations 544 119 544 
R2 0.024 0.049  
Pseudo R2   0.018 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix B  
Tables B1-B4 repeat the analysis from the main text, Tables 1-4, however, monetizing buffet 
contributions, i.e. assigning a value of €10 to each buffet contribution. This value was implied by 
the design of rewards. In Tables B1 and B3 the last 4 columns are skipped since the overall 
response rate is presented in the main table and the other columns are not relevant. Overall, the 
results presented here confirm the picture discussed in the main text.  
Table B1: Results of suggestions 
Treatment Number 
of 
subjects 
Number 
of 
gifts 
Return 
per mail 
Average 
positive 
donation 
(3) €10 272 66 3.162 13.030 
   (0.515) (1.605) 
(4) €20 273 64 3.374 14.391 
   (0.539) (1.686) 
T-test p-value 
(1)=(2) 
  0.776 0.560 
Mann-Whitney 
test p-value 
   0.261 
Note: standard error in parenthesis  
 
 
Table B2: Test of differences in distribution among treatments 
Treatment Number 
of 
subjects 
Frequency of giving 
€5 €10 €15 and more 
(3) €10 66 0.364 0.258 0.379 
  (0.060) (0.054) (0.060) 
(4) €20 64 0.219 0.359 0.406 
  (0.052) (0.060) (0.062) 
t-test p-value (1)=(2)  0.070 0.212 0.751 
Note: standard error in parenthesis, conditional on giving money. 
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Table B3: Results of different wording 
Treatment Number 
of 
subjects 
Number 
of gifts 
Return 
per 
mail 
Average 
positive 
donation 
(5) contribution 273 61 2.549 11.410 
   (0.345) (0.858) 
(6) donation 272 69 3.989 15.725 
   (0.659) (2.026) 
T-test p-value (1)=(2)   0.053 0.063 
Mann-Whitney test p-
value 
   0.167 
Note: standard error in parenthesis  
 
Table B4: Test of differences in distribution among treatments 
Treatment Number 
of 
subjects 
Frequency of giving 
€5 €10 €15 and more 
(7) contribution 61 0.311   0.361 0.311 
  (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) 
(8) donation 69 0.275 0.261 0.464 
  (0.054) (0.053) (0.060) 
t-test p-value (1)=(2)  0.654 0.222 0.077 
Note: standard error in parenthesis, conditional on giving money. 
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Appendix C 
First email (Different versions are marked with curly and angle brackets) 
Dear XXX-ers and friends, 
 
This year our WZB summer party follows the motto 
  
There is such a thing like a free lunch. 
 
The party will take place on Tuesday, the 5th of July, beginning at 4pm.  
And so this time we do not want to install a cash box on the day, however we do need your 
contributions {donations} to a crowdfunding campaign now. Below you will find more 
information. 
 
The XXX group is planning a party with: 
 
[Food & Drinks]: We are planning a BBQ with organic sausages that come from appropriately 
treated animals as well as the usual assortment of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages. In 
addition, there will be the well renowned WZB potluck buffet of salads and cakes. 
 
[Special Entertainment]: We are planning several (team) games and hands-on experiments, 
music, as well as a small campfire. Childcare and fun activities for children will be organized as 
usual by the Family Service. 
As usual, please send the information regarding the number of children for whom you need child 
care, and their respective ages to: yyy @yy.yy by June 24, 2016. 
 
In order to ensure that it will be a wonderful party, we are now starting a 
 
>>>>>>>>>> Crowdfunding Campaign <<<<<<<<<<< 
 
Contribute {Donate} to our summer party, please! 
 
For our summer party, we need your support with the food and drinks. You can do this through 
in-kind or money contributions, or preferably both!  
So, please, prepare salads and bake cakes for the 5th of July, and please also open your wallet 
(now)! 
 
For each contribution {donation} there is a Thank You, staggered as follows: 
 
[from € 5]: 
o    1 pass for all games and competitions (for example, Kicker, Kubb, Ping Pong) 
 
[from € 10 or 1 buffet contribution {donation}]: 
o    1 pass for all games and competitions (for example, Kicker, Kubb, Ping Pong) 
o Participation in a decision experiment with the possibility of winning 50 Euros or 
Participation  at a “tasting station” with the possibility of winning 50 Euros 
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[from € 20 or € 10 +1 buffet contribution {donation}]: 
o 1 pass for all games and game competitions (for example, Kicker, Kubb, Ping Pong) 
o Participation in a decision experiment with the possibility of winning 50 Euros 
o Participation  at a “tasting station” with the possibility of winning another 50 Euros 
 
[from € 30 or € 20 +1 buffet contribution {donation}]: 
o 1 pass for all games and game competitions (for example, Kicker, Kubb, Ping Pong) 
o Participation in a decision experiment with the possibility of winning 50 Euros 
o Participation  at a “tasting station” with the possibility of winning another 50 Euros 
o We will play 5 songs of your choice 
 
[over 100 € or 90 € + 1 buffet contribution {donation}]: 
o 1 pass for all games and game competitions (for example, Kicker, Kubb, Ping Pong) 
o Participation in a decision experiment with the possibility of winning 50 Euros 
o Participation  at a “tasting station” with the possibility of winning another 50 Euros 
o We will play 5 songs of your choice 
o A copy of the book "Fleisch und Farbe" (unique limited edition book, comprising only 100 
individually numbered prints). 
 
 
For every contribution {donation} made before 22.06.2016, an anonymous sponsor will make a 
bonus contribution {donation} of € 5 on your behalf. (However, these 5 euros are not included 
in the calculation of your “Thank You” Coupon.) 
 
If the average monetary contribution {donation} is 20 € <10€>, 
we need 100<200> participants in the campaign 
to cover the expected costs.* 
 
The current status of contributions {donation} will be documented daily on the Intranet at XXX 
(right column, updated each afternoon at 5 o'clock, Friday at 3). 
 
Your generous monetary contributions {donation} (or willingness to contribute {donation} to the 
buffet) can be confidentially made to xxxx (room xxx, between 9am-12 and 1pm - 5pm ). (Those 
who cannot make the contribution {donation} in person may contact xxxx [at: xxx.xxx@xxx.xx] 
for the account details in order to do an online bank transfer) ** 
 
[Your contribution {donation} does even more!] : Your contribution {donation} doesn’t only 
support the summer party as a public good. If we receive more contributions {donation} than 
required for financing the party, then the surplus will be used for an additional worthy project, 
e.g. to support the Women’s Bike Project, facilitated by the AG Refugees. 
 
We look forward to your active participation in the crowdfunding campaign, 
and also to a great party, 
 
The XXX 
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* The revenues will also be used to cover various minor costs, such as the purchase of bread, 
rolls, paper plates and cutlery as well as the music organization. 
 
** We will not announce any individual contribution {donation} information and guarantee 
confidentiality. 
*************************************************************************** 
First reminder 
Dear XXX-ers and friends, 
 
Maybe you have overlooked our email last week starting a crowdfunding campaign for this 
year's summer party (see below). We really believe that a party is much nicer without cash 
boxes so we hope you will join the crowd and help fund the party.  
 
Remember that if you contribute {donate} this week until Wednesday it will generate a match 
from an anonymous benefactor of five additional euros. 
 
All best 
The XXParty Team 
 
P.S. Crowdfunding barometer can be seen at xxx ! Take a look! 
****************************************************************************** 
Second reminder 
Re: Last match day (XXX summer party 2016) 
 
Dear XXX-ers and friends, 
 
while our crowdfunding campaign for the summer party will continue until end of June, 
TODAY is the last day where every contribution {donation} that we get will be matched by an 
additional 5 € from an anonymous benefactor. 
 
Until yesterday we collected inspiring 495€ (+185€ Boni) + 16 buffet pledges. 
Many thanks to all contributors {donors} so far! 
However, we are far away from the threshold we aim at  
(Needless to say, it won’t even cover the drinks). 
Therefore, we need you to 
join the crowd now! 
 
To clarify all open questions, let us explain the purpose and working of this campaign once more: 
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Everything what was traditionally organized and more: food (including vegetarian burgers and 
organic sausages), drinks (alcoholic and non-alcoholic), as well as music WILL BE FREE on 
the day. In addition, there will be the well renowned WZB potluck buffet of salads and cakes 
(also FREE). 
 
The rewards offered within the crowdfunding campaign are made only possible by the additional 
efforts of our department, are by no means standard, and should serve as additional motivation 
for the participation in the crowdfunding campaign.  
 
Follow the progress of the campaign at www.xxx.xx 
 
All best 
The XX Party Team 
****************************************************************************** 
Third reminder 
Last call: summer party crowdfunding and program 
 
 
Dear XXX-ers and friends,  
 
 
Less than a week is left till our amazing XXX summer party 2016 which takes place on Tuesday, 
5th of July, starting at 4 p.m. Since we don’t have a huge external sponsor this year, we need to 
rely on your participation in the crowdfunding campaign to finance the party!  
 
 
Until yesterday we collected inspiring 980€ (+395€ Boni) + 25 buffet pledges.  
Many thanks to all contributors {donors} so far!  
However, we are still missing the threshold we aim at.  
Two days left for contributions {donations}!  
Therefore, we need you to  
join the crowd now!  
(contributions {donations} are collected till the end of June by XXX,  
Room xxx, 9-12 a.m. and 1-5 p.m)  
 
Remember: If the average monetary contribution {donation} is 20 €<10€>,  
we need 100<200> participants in the campaign  
to cover the expected costs.  
 
 
Last call: please send the information regarding the number of children you would like to sign in 
for the XXX Kinderfest (organized by Familienservice child care animators), and their 
respective ages TODAY to: yyy.y@yyy.yy.  
 
 
Preliminary program:  
26 
 
From 4:00 p.m Barbeque (including veggie and vegan options), drinks, and potluck 
buffet  
From 4:00 p.m XXX Kinderfest fun activities for children. 
4:00-5:30 p.m. Tasting experiment (Provided you are eligible, you may participate at 
any time while open. It won't take long, and you have the chance of 
winning 50 Euros.) 
From 4:00 p.m Tournaments (in order to take part in Kicker (Foosball) or Table 
Tennis (Ping Pong) tournament you must sign up (alone or in pairs) till 
Friday 2 July with  ZZZ.zz@zzz.zzYou will be assigned the staring 
time. Kubb will be open for spontaneous teams.) 
5:00 p.m Experiment 2 (Those who are eligible will get a separate E-Mail with 
instructions. It is necessary to be on time since the experiment takes 
place simultaneously for all participants. You must also bring either 
your smart phone, tablet or laptop with an internet connection with you. 
There is a chance to win 40 or 10 Euros.) 
5:30 p.m We play your songs 
6:00 p.m. The results and winners of the experiments will be announced 
6:30-8:00 p.m. We are pleased to announce that XXX  and his band XXX 
(www.xxx.xx) will play at our party 
6:30 p.m Long drinks stand will be opened 
   
Follow the progress of the crowdfunding campaign at www.xx.xx 
 
 
All best  
 
The XX Party Team 
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